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1. Governmental policies of subsidizing the economy have become one of
the most contentious issues on the international agenda throughout the
past years. For a long time, the debate about the rights and wrongs of
subsidization has often been conducted in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many as though it were a peculiar non-German phenomenon rather ap-
plied by less market-oriented economies. Gradually, however, it is being
realized how far this is from the truth, and that like many other coun-
tries the Federal Republic, too, established an intensive array of sub-
sidy programmes.
At the Kiel Institute quite a lot of efforts have been undertaken to in-
vestigate the volume, the structure, and the effect of German subsidiza-
tion policy. Since most of those studies were published in German lan-
guage and since many inquiries from an English reading public turned
out to come in, this summarising paper was started to meet the inter-
national demand. Meanwhile, calculations were improved and figures were
updated, thus slight differences as against previous publications do oc-
cur . i
1. Missing Transparency
2. In public discussion the German system of subsidization is quite often
labelled as an impassable and ever expanding jungle. This predominant
impression mainly arises from the fact that not only the Federal
Government grants subsidies but also eleven federal states (Lander),
hundreds of municipalities, various parafiscal institutions, and state-
owned banks, all of them having developed and being constantly devel-
oping numerous subsidy programmes of their own. The total volume of
subsidization as well as its benefitting recipients are officially docu-
mented nowhere.
Since 1967 the Federal Government is obliged by law to publish a report
on her subsidies biannually [Deutscher Bundestag, a]. These reports
list about 300 different programmes specified either as expenditure out of
the federal budget or as tax relief; in different annexes some measures
of state and local budgets are reported, as well. However, this official
document does by no means set up a fairly clear picture of German sub-
sidization policy. There are several shortcomings which restrict its in-
formation value [cf. OECD, 1983, pp. 120]. Not the least among these
deficiencies is the lack of agreement as to what actually constitutes a
subsidy. The Federal Government has changed her definition of subsidies
several times in the past either because of a systematic revision of her
way of reporting about them or on an ad-hoc basis, but after each revi-
sion, the new volumes of subsidization were shown to be smaller than
before. According to these official reports the relative importance of
subsidies (p.c. of GDP), granted by the Federal Government, has been
declining since long whereas other sources of data really indicate the
opposite.
The governmental documentation of subsidies and its selection criteria
are widely based on political value judgements. Thus the initial prere-
quisite for a comprehensive analysis of subsidization policy needs a clari-
fication of the definitial issue.- 2 -
3. It should be noted that this paper owes its existence to a recent
study on the structural performance of the German economy which was
carried out for the Federal Government [Schmidt et al., 1984] and from
which the bulk of data analyzed here is drawn. Within the setting of this
project the Federal Government expected a full picture of subsidization
policy covering even borderline cases. Actually, the definition chosen
widely follows the one which was used 1972 by the US Congress: "..., a
subsidy is defined as the provision of Federal economic assistance, at
the expense of others in the economy, to the private sector producers or
consumers of a particular good, service, or factor of production. The
Government receives no equivalent compensation in return, but condi-
tions the assistance on a particular performance by the recipient - a
quid pro quo - that has the effect of altering the price or costs of the
particular good, service, or factor to the recipient, so as to encourage
or discourage the output, supply, or use of these items and the related
economic behavior" [U.S. Congress, 1972, p. 18]. As compared to the
official definition of the German Government the big advantage of the
American definition is that it is broad based and that it emphasizes the
instrumental character of subsidies but abstracts from normative aspects
which may justify a programme. In order to get the definition to opera-
tion, the following explications and technical adjustments were necessary:
- All those authorities which according to the nomenclature of the Na-
tional Account. Statistics form part of the state sector are specified as
suppliers of subsidies. Thus state-owned enterprises are excluded but
several parafiscal institutions and funds are incorporated.
- Apart from the state sector all other economic branches are determined
as potential recipients of subsidies, thus including public enterprises
like the Federal Railways and the Federal Post Office.
- Government assistance comprises both tax expenditures and direct
transfer payments to enterprises and private households. However,
private households are only included in so far as particular goods and
services are concerned (e.g. insurance, housing, traffic); general
social welfare and pension payments are not incorporated.
4. The data-set was widely compiled from the annual budget documents.
Fortunately, the accounting system of public households is rather de-
tailed and uniform for all government levels so that the identification of
subsidy programmes segregated into expenditure items and granting
ministries was possible without any major difficulties. Tax expenditure
items were taken from the official subsidy reports and supplemented by
some calculations and estimates of our own. By evaluating numerous ad-
ditional information from ministries and other sources, each subsidy pro-
gramme was finally broken down to a maximum of 49 branches of recipi-
ents for some selected years (1).
The inventory showed that the German system of subsidization consists
of roughly 10 000 different budgetary items. The results of our efforts
added up to an amount of 103 billion D-Mark in 1980, thus being more
than 50 p.c. higher than is documented by the official subsidy reports
of the Federal Government (Table 1).
(1) A detailed description of the whole procedure contains Jiittemeier
[1984].- 3 -
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2. Trends and Overall Pattern of German Subsidization Policy
5. In 1984 German public authorities transferred 120 billion D-Mark for
subsidization purposes (Table 1). As compared to 1973 this means more
than doubling the volume (7.0 p.c. per annum). During the same period
the incomes (net value added at factor costs) of the subsidy recipients
increased by a rate of 5.9 p.c. and the tax revenues of the subsidy
suppliers by 5.8 p.c. per annum. The comparison reveals that the sub-
sidization elasticity is greater than 1 and by this indicates an expansive
trend. There is, indeed, a widespread subsidization mentality both on
suppliers' and recipients' side, and its intensity is gaining in strength.
6. An interruption of the trend, noteworthy indeed, is to be observed
for 1981 with a zero growth rate.
- In previous years subsidies have increased drastically, 1977 and 1978
with two-digit rates. After the first oil-price crisis several additional
programmes were introduced which were meant to foster the restruc-
turing process of the German economy. These programmes expired at
the beginning of the eighties and subsidization policy stabilized on a
higher level.
- The then decline of the exchange rate D-Mark against US-Dollar made
foreign coal more expensive and as a consequence, the subsidized dif-- 4 -
ferential between domestic and US-Dollar denominated international
prices made less deficiency payments necessary.
- Subsidies out of CAP were comparatively small at the beginning of the
eighties. Since the world-market prices of agricultural products were
extremely high only few export subsidies were required.
After 1981, however, subsidies increased again. In June 1982 the then
Federal Government of chancellor Schmidt introduced a huge temporary
and cyclically motivated investment-bonus-programme which in 1984
(1985) had to be honoured by 4.1 (2.2) billion D-Mark. And when the
new Federal Government of chancellor Kohl came into power in October
1982, she immediately introduced various tax reliefs (e.g. for agriculture
and housing) which in 1984 result in an annual loss of tax revenues of
about 7 billion D-Mark. Moreover, the new Federal Government started to
subsidize the iron and steel industry to a greater extent than ever be-
fore. And as far as CAP is concerned, its expenditures are meanwhile
increasing so dramatically that the whole system of intervention might go
into bankruptcy. Altogether, from 1981 to 1984 subsidies rose by a year-
ly rate of 5.2 p.c. whereas total government spending increased by 2.7
p.c.
7. Governments provide a large range of subsidies. For some subgroups,
the amounts are listed in Table 2. There are basically two forms a sub-
sidy can take - tax expenditure and financial assistance -, with
numerous variations within each form. Tax reliefs represent lost govern-
ment revenues; they account for roughly one third of the whole volume
of subsidization, the biggest part consisting of deductions of certain
items from the tax base (e.g. specific write-off regulations). Financial
assistance stands for cash-transfers from public households. By far the
most important single item consists of current transfers, mobilized for
various purposes, like deficiency payments, deficit compensations, re-
search aids and others.
From the recipient's perspective the value of the different kinds of sub-
sidies is not the same. For instance, the incentive value for tax defer-
rals consists of savings on interest payments and the benefit from direct
government loans lies in the difference between preferential and market
interest rates. Furtheron the value of some tax reliefs varies with the
recipient's marginal tax rate, and some kinds of financial assistance have
to be inserted into the tax base but others don't. These differences
must be taken into account when calculating the value of subsidy pro-
grammes from the recipients' perspective. However, if this is done cor-
rectly, there is much reason to expect that with a same effective
amount, the various kinds of subsidies have a similar impact on the eco-
nomic activity that shall be fostered. Thus, the different types of
governmental assistance may be regarded as close substitutes for one
another.
8. One of the more striking features about German subsidization policy is
its rather large decentralization. Table 3 lists the institutional setting
for the main sources of supply both for tax expenditure and financial
assistance. But the picture is more confusing because on each govern-
ment level nearly each ministry is involved in the process. The central
government level, for example, consists of 17 ministries each of them- 5 -
Table 2 - Subsidies Classified By Type, 1973-1984
Type of subsidy
1. Tax Expenditures





























































































































































granting some kind of assistance. Moreover, there are quite a lot of
state-owned credit institutions - not listed in Table 3 - their only task
being to assist governmental subsidization policy by granting preferential
loans [Juttemeier, Schatz, 1983].
9. However, when it comes to the assignment of responsibility and policy
formulation the role 'of the Federal Government is by far the most im-
portant one. Beyond her own budget central government has a signifi-
cant influence on the level and structure of other authorities' subsidies
as well:- 6 -
Table 3 - Subsidies Classified by Sources of Supply, 1973-1984
Sources of Subsidy Supply
1. Tax Expenditures





















































































































































































- Programmes of the parafiscal funds are executed outside federal ad-
ministration but the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs determines
their volume and structure (1).
(1) The ERP-(European Recovery Programme) Fund is a special property
of the Federal Government. Its assets originally stem from US aids
granted to Western European countries after World War II. While the
German Federal Government had to repay in terms of US-$ which she
did in 1961, private recipients of US deliveries had to make D-Mark
payments to the Federal Government. Thus, the ERP-Fund repre-
sents the D-Mark countervalues of US aids. Today the fund is total-
ly financed in a revolving way of credit repayments and interest
payments. In 1952 the assets of the ERP-Fund accounted for roughly
D-Mark 5 bn and at present for about D-Mark 10 bn. The fund is at
the disposal of the Federal Government and she uses it mostly for- 7 -
- The annual budgets of the Labour Office are approved by the Federal
Government and are supervised by the Federal Minister of Labour
Affairs.
- Volume and structure of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EC are
strongly fixed by the Federal Minister of Agricultural Affairs and his
colleagues from other member countries.
- With regard to tax policy the constitution of the Federal Republic pro-
vides for most taxes a co-operative legislation of Federal Parliament
(Bundestag) together with the state governments' representative body
(Bundesrat). Nevertheless, experience shows that there are rarely any
cases of tax relief which were not initiated and enforced, by federal
authorities. The whole system of taxation and concessions is largely a
matter of the federal level. [:••'.
- Principles of fiscal federalism are watered-down on the expenditure
side of budgets also. Apart from co-operative duties embodied in the
constitution (Gemeinschaftsaufgaben) federal governments often force
state governments to participate in special federal subsidy programmes
(coal, steel, shipyards, countercyclical and general structural meas-
ures) .
On the whole, cautious calculations indicate that Federal Government and
Parliament are politically responsible for roughly four fifths of the whole
volume of subsidization [Jiittemeier, 1984, pp. 36].
10. Politicians perceive subsidies as an appropriate instrument in order
to correct or to prevent unwanted results of the competitive market in
reference to a political norm. In other words, the volume of subsidization
which is supplied may be regarded as an index manifesting the correc-
tion requirements of politicians. Tables 4 and A2 show the main fields of
operation grouped according to the UN classification system of govern-
ment functions.
- The biggest part is spent for sector specific programmes, like agri-
culture, coal mining, iron and steel industry, shipyards, all means of
transportation, tax relief for public banks.
- The social security function comprises a variety of measures like gen-
eral employment schemes of the Labour Office and the promotion of
newly establishing entrepreneurs but also selective aid programmes for
farmers, miners, construction workers, tenants, and to private non-
profit institutions.
- The amounts of regional and research related programmes balance each
other. Both policy functions often provide subsidies in sectorally
rather unspecific ways. Nevertheless, there are sectoral concentra-
tions: Structurally strong branches absorb more research aid while the
weaker ones demand more assistance from regional policy schemes
(Table A2).
structural adjustment policies. - The Coal Equalization Fund which in
public is better known as "coal penny" is financed through an extra-
levy on the consumption of electricity. The revenues are used to
subsidize the input of domestic coal in electric power plants.- 8 -


























































aPublic order and safety affairs included
cHousing affairs, fuel and



























































































 bHealth affairs included. -
agriculture, forestry, fishing
resource affairs, manufacturing and construction
affairs, transportation and cmiiiunication affairs•
Source: Jiittemeier, 1987.
Over the years being analyzed the shares of the different functions do
not vary very much; a slight decrease is to be observed for sector spe-
cific programmes. However, due to new programmes (agriculture, steel
industry, housing) it has been increasing after 1981 significantly.
11. With respect to the impacts of subsidization policy on the structure
of the economy, it is important to know which sectors are subsidized.
Inter-industry variations in the level of subsidization indicate the direc-
tion of influence on relative prices among sectors.
Breaking down the volume by sectors (Table 5, Al) reveals that the
service sector is the most important recipient of subsidies (roughly one- 9 -


































































































third) while subsidies for the production sector are increasing most
strongly. The comparison demonstrates, too, if one wants to get to the
core of the subsidization problem it is not advisable to concentrate the
analysis on the production sector as is often done by the public. In 1984
subsidies for the service sector account for D-Mark 4 700 per employee
and D-Mark 14 500 for agriculture, but D-Mark 2 000 for the production
industries. Thus substantial distortions of competition and structures
seem likely. However, one should keep in mind that agriculture and pro-
duction industries also benefit from tariff-protection while the service
sector is rather discriminated.
3. The Sectoral Pattern of German Subsidization Policy
12. The outstanding feature of a subsidy is its double-faced nature of
both benefitting and discriminating. This emerges from the fact that as-
sistance is not granted to all branches, nor to all factors of production,
nor to all regions, nor to all goods and services, etc., and thus estab-
lishes a selectivity which is tantamount to a change of relative prices:
For example, if investments are subsidized, this induces an alteration of
the price relation between capital and labour and as a consequence cre-
ates incentives to use more capital than otherwise would be the case.
Suppliers of subsidies sometimes argue that subsidization measures
should be designed in a way as not to impose competitive distortions on
others [9th Subsidy Report, 1983, p. 7]. However, this best of inten-
tions is simply absurd because it is just the constituent element, the
characteristic of subsidies to artificially improve the competitive strength- 10 -
of branches, single enterprises, factors of production or even whole
regions. Subsidization always means a selective intervention into the
structure of production by giving incentives to reallocate resources
among their alternative uses. For this reason, it is important to empha-
size the discriminative nature of subsidies in their various dimensions.
a) The Extent of Selectivity at the Government's Level
13. A meaningful subsidization policy presupposes at the supplier's level
a target in mind about what is intended. For German subsidization policy
very specific sectoral alignments are predominant: four fifths of the total
volume originate from budgetary items which were conceived for one
single enterprise or branch, thus discriminating all the others. But just
9 p.c. are derived from sectorally broad-based schemes out of which 25
or more branches obtain their benefits (Table A4). In order to describe
the quantitive extent of governments' sectoral preferences, discrimination
indices (1) have been constructed. The two indices (Table A4) uniso-
nously identify agriculture, coal mining, all means of transportation, and
most other service industries as government's favourites but only few
branches out of manufacturing (shipbuilding, aerospace). Nearly the
same intersectoral profile holds true for the level of subsidization in in-
dividual branches (Table A3). Spearman-rank correlations show a clear
positive association between discrimination indices and degrees of sub-
sidization (R = 0.77 and 0.75). This allows the conclusion that the de-
gree of subsidization of individual branches is the higher the more
branch-specific the programmes are which they enjoy.
14. Planning and designing subsidization policy rather exclusively on a
sectoral basis begs several questions. Do German governments pursue an
industrial policy, an industrial targeting of a sector-related kind? Which
are the economic arguments, i.e. the economic philosophy, explaining the
allocation of subsidies to particular industries?
In standard textbooks of public finance subsidies are treated as an in-
strument serving the promotion of allocative efficiency by compensating
for such market failure as it is measured against the normative criteria
of Paretian welfare economics. Insofar as the existence and implications
of market failure can be identified, subsidies would be limited to com-
pensations for (positive) externalities or for the supply of public goods
by private agents. As empirical evidence reveals such theoretical sup-
(1) The discrimination indices were derived from Theil's measures of
income inequality [Theil, 1967, pp. 91] the calculation of which con-
siders for each group of individuals (economic branches) the number
of persons in any given income interval (number of branches partici-
pating in a programme) and their respective income shares (amount
of subsidies). From our inventory of German subsidization policy, it
is well known for each programme (budgetary item) how many bran-
ches participate in it and to what extent. Assuming that the number
of recipients (maximum 49 branches) for a given programme reflects
the supplier's restriction on the sectoral range of potential benefici-
aries, the intersectoral profile of index-values allows some conclu-
sions with regard to the preferential treatment of specific sectors at
the government's level.- 11 -
positions of welfare economics do not have much explanatory power for
the structure and the volume of subsidies in the Federal Republic. This
is not to say that arguments concerning market failure were not deployed
by the government in general discussions. However, not one single pro-
gramme was found the reasons for which or the volume of which were
based on such criteria or could be based on them, holding to scrutiny.
15. On the contrary, German subsidization policy is mostly substantiated
by political value judgements. Yet, the normative objectives of this
policy being positively observed are often difficult to find out if any at
all. The law underlying the Federal Government's biannual report on
subsidies determines that for every programme the policy objectives have
to be listed. Actually, the column "objectives" mostly contains a descrip-
tion of instruments, assessment bases, or the legal regulations under
which subsidies will be granted. In numerous cases it simply says "cost
reductions for agriculture", "improvement of the status of earnings and
liquidity of coal mining", or even more simply it states "promotion of air
traffic", "of savings behaviour", "of showmen's business", or "social
consideration", or "good for public welfare". By and large it seems that
the suppliers of subsidies - the politicians - do not really know them-
selves which overall social or economic goals they are striving for. Re-
ducing costs or improving the status of liquidity should not be an end in
itself! The budgetary committee of the Federal Parliament once called
upon the Federal Government to define her objectives in such a way as
to make subsidy controls possible. "Concerning the matter in question,
the Federal Government declares that it is difficult - if not impossible -
to fulfil such requirements" [ Deutscher Bundestag, 1979, p. 39, own
translation]. Since 1982 the new Federal Government even tries to catch
up with criticism about her lack of subsidy targets by classifying some
of the largest programmes (e.g. agriculture, coal mining, housing) as a
sacrosanct matter of constitutional norms [Deutscher Bundestag, c,
1985, p. 11].
16. In addition to the justification of individual subsidy programmes
which is required by law and which sometimes look rather embarassing,
Federal Government occasionally announces her sectoral intentions in a
manner which is still very general but at least is accessible to analysis.
If one was summarizing these various governmental declarations and
documents the result would be a picture probably corresponding to
similar doctrines in most other countries (1).
An utmost verbal emphasis is put on assistance to increase productivity
and economic growth. Government believes that especially aearospace,
data processing and nuclear energy fit into this idea and providing them
with funds means an investment into future-oriented industries. On the
other hand, coal mining is labelled as a "problematic industry" the sup-
port of which is necessary in order to adjust its capacity to new market
conditions without any major "social cruelties". And since hard coal is
the country's only major domestic energy resource, subsidization is also
seen as part of a policy towards a national strategic energy reserve.
(1) In 1968 Federal Government published a non-obligatory declaration of
principles concerning the sectoral dimension of her structural policies
[cf. Deutscher Bundestag, d], to which today's government refers
as well.- 12 -
The heading "special problems" implies shipyards and steel industry.
Assisting them is mostly regarded as a compensation for subsidies
abroad. Agricultural policies mostly refer to the Rome Treaty or to a
corresponding national agricultural law from 1955. Reasons given are, for
instance, the best possible and secure supply of food, compensations for
natural and economic disadvantages, adjusting farmers' social status to
conditions in other professions, etc. However, neither national law nor
the Rome Treaty demand subsidies, let alone a specifically stamped sub-
sidization policy. A multitude of objectives is also enumerated for sub-
sidizing transport, housing and other service industries but again with-
out any weighting of different targets: Backbone of traffic (federal rail-
ways), basic needs (housing, medical care), creation of private property
(housing), saving of energy (housing, transport), social policy for
special groups of the population (housing, transport, private non-profit
institutions), regional development (traffic), and others.
17. Regional considerations, in fact, form another important line of argu-
mentation for subsidization. Since Germany is a federation made up of
eleven states, regional interests play a somewhat larger role in
policy-making than might be the case in more centralized countries.
Apart from some sectorally broad-based programmes, the territorial ex-
tension of which is limited to structurally weak regions and West-Berlin,
a lot of sector-specific schemes might be interpreted as a special kind of
regional policy as well. Coal mining and steel industry play a dominant
part in the Ruhr and Saar areas, shipyards are concentrated in four
coastal states, and aerospace in Bavaria, Bremen, and Hamburg. Agri-
culture is still important for quite a lot of less developed areas in some
federal states, and quite often Federal Railways are forced to maintain
deficitary routes in those areas. There is always a rivalry among the
federal states to "haul ashore" out of the federal budget some benefits
for industries located on their territories, for no matter what reasons.
18. Analyzing the description of individual subsidy programmes and the
denomination of aims for subsidization in other documents, does not pro-
vide for something like a coherent concept or a systematic guideline be-
hind German subsidization policy. Normally several distributional and
allocational targets are mentioned at the same time but without making
any references to different weightings or to priorities. From the very
strong alignment of subsidy programmes to single enterprises and bran-
ches (Table A4), one would especially expect an evaluation of sectoral
selection criteria. The provision of subsidies for such specific reasons
would require that the government takes a paternalistic view claiming
that her own forecasts of the future development are better than those
of private agents. However, a uniform or clear-cut subsidization ration-
ale does not exist. On the contrary, German subsidization policy rather
appears as a sum of a wide range of ad-hoc measures.
Moreover, very often declared official objectives do not seem to be con-
sistent over time. Especially in case of highly subsidized branches, any
reason or objective put forward for further subsidization is urgently
welcome, and in particular so, if it can be labelled as "socially desir-
able" . In order to understand the inherent logic of German subsidization
policy, a polit-economic approach seems to be more promising than an
economic theory-based analysis which refers to market failure and cor-
rection requirements. Variables like lobbying and vote-maximizing have aulniHtufe for Welt «nrtsd«ffl
great explanatory power to the level and structure of German subsidiza-
tion policy [cf. Glismann, Weiss, 1980]. As a whole, the sectoral profile
of German subsidization policy rarely reflects differences in economic
facts but rather is an index for successful pressure-groups.
b) The Extent of Selectivity in an Intersectoral Comparison
19. Uniformity of assistance means that no activity is favoured or dis-
criminated relative to any other. Thus the differences in subsidies among
industries and sectors are important from an allocational point of view.
In order to evaluate subsidization policy in an intersectoral comparison
the concept of effective rates of protection was used by analogy [ Hie-
menz et al., 1971]. Assuming that the incidence rests upon the sectors
to which assistance is granted, subsidies mean at the recipient's level
revenues which enlarge the scope for increase of expenses (incomes) to
the factors of production. Expressed as a percentage of net value added
at factor costs, degrees of subsidization are calculated which can be
interpreted as an index for allocational distortions. Of course, such
figures cannot tell whether the allocational impact results in higher fac-
tor prices and/or in an increasing production. However, degrees of sub-
sidization do show the overall extent of incentives which exists to bind
resources in an industry or to attract them from others.
20. Since 1973 the average degree of subsidizing the German economy
has increased in cyclical movements starting from 9.5 p.c. then to 11.1
p.c. at present (Table 1). Yet, the aggregates hide the fact that level
and development of subsidization are extremely inequal among the differ-
ent sectors and that throughout the years observed, the basic hierarchy
of industries which are subsidized above average, does not change very
much. At the beginning of the seventies twelve branches out of 49 had
above-average degrees of subsidization, and at the beginning of the
eighties the same sectoral composition plus tobacco industry still held
true (Table A3). In succession of their degrees of subsidization these
branches are (1979-82): Railways (>1000 p.c), non-profit institutions
(418 p.c), agriculture (273 p.c), coal mining (91 p.c), housing (53
p.c), shipbuilding (39 p.c), aircraft (32 p.c), health and veterinary
services (22 p.c), navigation (21 p.c), other mining than coal mining
(18 p.c), other transports than railways and navigation (15 p.c), and
tobacco (13 p.c). Except for tobacco industry the subsidization of all
these branches is mostly a matter of sector-specific programmes (Table
A4). Tobacco is, indeed, a special case. Most of its subsidies stem from
sectorally broad-based programmes which are meant to compensate for
the political and geographical disadvantages of factories, located in West-
Berlin. And since some of these programmes are very attractive (invest-
ment grants, wage bonus, half the rate of value added tax), meanwhile
most tobacco manufacturing plants moved to Berlin.
21. In general, manufacturing industries are subsidized very much below
the average of the total economy (1980-81: 2.5 p.c versus 10.8 p.c),
but some branches seem to be on their way to close the gap. Compared
by the increase of subsidies relative to the respective incomes, sprinters
in the subsidy race are iron and steel industry, chemicals and in that
field particularly nuclear fuel generation, paper production, and ship-
building. Noteworthy is especially the development in the iron and steel- 14 -
industry. Still at the end of the seventies, steel industry only now and
then received some assistance out of broad-based schemes, and the
American Trade Board did not see any compelling arguments either for
counteractions against German companies. In 1978, however, the Federal
Government and the state government of Saarland gradually started to
subsidize the ARBED-Saarstahl Company to a large extent by means of a
so-called restructuring programme for steel mills of the Saar area. Mean-
while, subsidy programmes covering all steel companies came into exist-
ence and from 1981 to 1984 steel industry's amount of subsidies increased
fivefold thus exceeding the average degree of subsidization for the total
economy.
There are also a few branches which are to be regarded as counterparts
of the sprinters. In the aircraft, aerospace industry the degree of
subsidization fell significantly from 65 p.c. to 32 p.c. (Table A3) and
for data processing assistance even decreased in terms of D-Mark (Table
Al). Remarkable is the decline for data processing since it is one of the
rare cases where Federal Government suspended her sector-specific pro-
grammes due to a failure of her policy of "picking a winner". The rea-
sons for previously granted assistance were typical for infant-industries:
Data processing, like some other industries, is said to have substantial
spin-offs in other fields of the economy. After World War II German com-
panies were not allowed to operate in this field - that was also the case
with aerospace and nuclear energy - but when they finally got the per-
mission, a technological gap was said to discriminate them against their
main international competitors. Even though they received large sums of
assistance the subsidized computers did not succeed on the market, and
Federal Government finally altered her policy for the benefit of a more
broad-based innovation policy.
22. Scrutinizing the system of subsidization grouped by governmental
functions reveals that subsidizing manufacturing industries mainly con-
sists of three types, research-related, region-related, and sector-
specific programmes (Table A2).
- Programmes to promote research activities constitute one important
source (30 p.c). The government prefers financial assistance for in-
dividual projects framed to specific industries and products (direct
promotion), while tax relief for general activities (indirect promotion)
is of minor importance. The sectoral pattern certainly specifies nearly
all branches as recipients of research aids, but actually only very few
of them with appreciable amounts (mechanical as well as electrical engi-
neering, aircraft, chemical and nuclear fuel industry). Moreover, there
is a further intrasectoral concentration: A small group of the largest
German manufacturing companies absorbs most funds. For 1974 figures
are available showing that 13 big companies obtained 70 p.c. of all
such research aids to manufacturing industries which were provided by
the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology (80 p.c.) [ Jiittemeier
et al., pp. 174].
- The most important source of subsidies to manufacturing industries are
general programmes which are meant to promote specific regions (Table
A2). Such programmes incorporate West-Berlin, and an area along the
border to East-Germany and Czechoslovakia, as well as other regions
which have an economic status very much below the average of the
Federal Republic. This concept of regional promotion is rather broad-- 15 -
based, that is to say, there are only few regulations concerning the
exclusion of certain industries from regional-related assistance. How-
ever, the sectoral distribution of such subsidies suggests that there is
a slight bias towards capital-intensive branches.
- At the beginning of the eighties, sectoral policy schemes were still of
minor significance (14 p.c.). Only shipbuilding, aerospace, steel in-
dustry, and nuclear fuel generation have benefitted to a larger extent.
Allocating public funds to aircraft and nuclear energy is part of a
policy to pick the winners, while assistance for shipyards and steel
industry is part of the maintenance of declining industries and un-
profitable firms in order to avoid immediate sacrifices for the labour
force. Since shipyards and steel companies are still under heavy com-
petitive pressure from abroad, and since their regional concentration is
very high, Federal Government and the respective state governments
intensified their programmes substantially.
23. Facing the analysis that there exist hundreds of subsidy programmes
and that all branches participate to some degree, this should not obscure
the fact that, since long, the intersectoral structure of incentives to
reallocate resources, represented by degrees of subsidization, is ex-
tremely oriented towards a constant set of branches. In 1980-81: 12
branches subsidized above average received 80 p.c. of the total amount
of all subsidies whereas their share in incomes (value added at factor
cost) was only 20 p.c. Within this set of branches subsidized above
average, there is a strong negative correlation between the economic
performance (long-term growth-rates of real gross value added) and the
degrees of subsidization; its strength is even increasing for changes of
subsidization levels. Thus, much evidence is provided that despite
official announcements to the contrary, most structural aids are of a
long-run nature and little evidence can be found for a temporary
subsidization, i.e. a "tapering off" strategy.
24. For the total of all industries the matter is somewhat more complex.
Cross-section analyses for the level of subsidization at different periods
of time do not provide much evidence for a prevailing policy. This may
be due to the fact that levels at any point in time are the product of a
whole host of interacting factors, many of which are historical and per-
haps do no longer reflect the present outlook of policy makers. Thus,
for instance, the reports on subsidies of the Federal Government list
numerous cases of individual subsidies which have already lasted for
decades. The oldest one has existed since 1868 (tax exemption from the
salt duty for salted herrings). Indeed, there is a tendency to add new
programmes each time a new "problem" arises but seldom to abolish old
subsidies.
Changes in subsidization levels might provide a somewhat clearer indi-
cation of the prevailing policy. Comparing the relative ranking of all
industries by changes of their degree of subsidization between 1973-74
and 1980-81 and by their growth performance from 1960 to 1983 reveals a
negative association. However, the level of statistical significance is un-
satisfactory. What can only be said with more certainty is, that German
subsidization policy as a whole is not oriented towards a strategy of
picking the winners as is often announced by politicians, but the oppo-
site - picking the loosers or maintaining declining industries - is not- 16 -
unambiguous, either. Obviously, there is a bipartition in the inter-in-
dustrial distribution of the total volume of subsidization: On the one
hand, there is a small group of highly subsidized industries which are
favoured for whatever political reasons, and their subsidization in the
course of time shows an increasing bias towards relatively declining
branches. On the other hand, a majority of industries is participating in
the subsidy race from the rear. They simply take part as fellow travel-
lers .
25. Despite many methodical difficulties the impact of subsidies on in-
comes and employment can be localized to' a certain degree, at least,
whereas the costs of this policy are entirely hidden. Invisible charges
derive from the fact that subsidizing one enterprise reversely results in
higher taxes on others in order to finance this kind of policy. Thus the
maintenance or creation of jobs through subsidies corresponds to a loss
or non-establishment of jobs through higher taxation. At least, some
approximations concerning the load of burden may be derived through
calculating effective tax rates imposed on incomes (value added) of
enterprises (1). Subtracting tax rates from subsidy rates a net-burden
of taxation is calculated, the intersectoral profile of which may be re-
garded as a clue to the government's true sectoral preferences.
26. In 1979-80 the average burden of taxation of all industries (except
for housing and private non-profit institutions) roughly ran up to 10
p.c. of their value added (about D-Mark 95 bn per year) and the aver-
age relief through subsidies amounted to 7 p.c. (about D-Mark 70 bn
per year). Taking into account that most tax reliefs are already em-
bodied in actual tax payments, the balance of tax burden and relief
through subsidization results in a net-tax-rate of 3.5 p.c. of value
added. This net-rate can be regarded as a basic tax-rate which indicates
the amount to which enterprises shall participate in financing government
expenditures of a non-subsidizing kind (D-Mark 33 bn per year). Devia-
tions from the basic tax-rate then represent the redistributional element
among the economic sectors (D-Mark 40 bn per year) , and its intersec-
toral pattern indicates the direction of allocational distortions. As a mat-
ter of fact, the sectoral net-rates enlisted in Table 6 only make a rough
outline. They hide the fact that tax-rates for individual enterprises may
deviate substantially. The broad reference base of value added hides, as
well, that actual assessment bases of taxes are widely eroded by numer-
ous exemptions and as a consequence nominal tax-rates have to be in-
creased in order to guarantee a certain amount of revenues, thus being
many times higher than the average rates enlisted in Table 6.
(1) Included are all direct taxes of enterprises, i.e. corporate and in-
come tax, property tax, and local business tax. The latter is a tax
levied by municipalities, and it is imposed both on capital yields and
capital assets. For all other taxes paid by enterprises, mostly value
added tax and specific excise taxes, it is assumed that their final
incidence rests upon private households. In order to illustrate the
extent of allocational distortions, both tax-burden and relief through
subsidization are expressed as percentages of value added at factor
cost (tax-rate and subsidy-rate).- 17 -
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(a) Direct taxes minus financial assistance and minus tax expenditures as far as
they are not reflected by payments of direct taxes, (b) Duties of the Federal
Post Office to the Federal Government.
Source: Schmidt et al., 1984, p. 119.
27. The sectors of agriculture, mining, and transport are net-recipients
of subsidies to an intensive degree; they neither contribute to the fi-
nancing of their subsidies nor to other governmental expenditures. On a
smaller scale this is true for forestry and fisheries, as well. All other
sectors of Table 6, however, are net-loosers in the subsidy race. Going
into details reveals that banks and private insurance companies, relative-
ly seen, contribute most to the financing of subsidies and the Federal
Post Office the least of all. By and large industries of the production
sector contribute less than those of the service sector. On the whole,
there exists a strong negative association between the intersectoral pat-
tern of net-tax-rates and long-term-rates of economic growth. This
means that German subsidization policy normally withdraws means from
production-lines which are efficient and strong in growth, in order to
favour less efficient branches.
As a result of a pure mechanistic calculation one might conclude that
under ceteris-paribus-conditions more jobs would be maintained in highly
subsidized branches than would alternatively be created in other indus-
tries. But taking also into consideration that the alternative jobs would
have been more productive than those actually subsidized and, further-
on, accounting for the fact that non-subsidizing regularly means a more- 18 -
efficient allocation of resources, a contrary conclusion is evident: With-
out the allocational distortions created through granting and financing
subsidies, national incomes and employment, as well, could be on higher
level than they actually are at present. This consequence, indeed, is the
main result of a study carried out at the Kiel Institute of World Eco-
nomics which simulates the implications on the level of economic perfor-
mance and employment by cutting the total volume of subsidization by 50
p.c. [cf. Gerken et al.', 1985].
c) The Extent of Selectivity at the Intra-sectoral Level
28. In this section an attempt is made to investigate a bit more into the
intra-industrial structure of German subsidization policy. It has long
been recognized that the kind of composition of a subsidy programme
may have at the recipient's level significant distortionary impacts on out-
put, on labour, on capital, or other economic activities. In general, one
can suppose that governments will condition their assistance in a way as
to get as close as possible to the divergence to be corrected or the ac-
tivity to be fostered, and hence trying to minimize leakages and un-
wanted by-product effects. The transmitting mechanism of a subsidy is
the change in relative prices which results from the promotion of specific
aggregates.









































































































29. Table 7 contains a breakdown of subsidies according to the initial
points which governments have chosen in order to insert their assistance
intra-industrially.- 19 -
- The central point of German subsidization policy is marked by the pre-
ference given to capital outlays and receipts. More than one quarter of
all subsidies are directly assigned to promote fixed capital formation.
One fifth is related to entrepreneurial incomes of which in 1984 D-Mark
15.0 bn concern the formation of incomes (e.g. tax base reductions for
farmers and self-employed professions), D-Mark 7.6 bn concern the
distribution of -different classes of income (except for labour; e.g.
dividends, interest payments, rents) as well as the compensation of
deficits (railways), and D-Mark 1.4 bn concern the formation of equity
capital (e.g. coal mining, railways, communication, specific programmes
for small and medium-sized enterprises).
- Labour income related subsidies are generally of minor importance.
Some sector-specific programmes, for instance, favour agriculture
(take-over of social security contributions by the Federal Govern-
ment), coal mining (additional wage-bonus for pit miners), and con-
struction (bad weather pay). Sectorally broad-based programmes exist
for R&D-related personnel and for employees working in West-Berlin.
- An increasing share is assigned to gross output which actually sig-
nifies either promoting sales or maintaining high domestic prices or
compensating for them. Subsidy programmes which are meant to reduce
suppliers
1 sales prices are available for exports from West-Berlin to the
other parts of the Federal Republic (reduced rates of value added
tax), for specific goods and services (e.g. reduced rates of value
added tax for books and medical service, preferential treatment of the
income tax for some kinds of insurance contracts) or for new ships
and planes. Maintaining high prices, sometimes to an excessive degree,
is the main duty of CAP; it is also given for coal mining through de-
ficiency payments to electric power plants (Coal Equalization Fund) and
to the iron and steel industry (consumption of domestic coke). Other
product related deficiency payments concern subsidies to German ship-
owners, if their ships are built on German shipyards, or rent allow-
ances for specific groups of the population.
- Intermediate inputs are favoured through a wide range of measures. A
lot of subsidy programmes are outlined to cover costs which stand for
mostly material inputs except for investment but to some degree for
labour, too. This is especially true for most R&D programmes of the
Federal Ministry for Research and Technology but also for the promo-
tion of specific organizations (e.g. Private Non-Profit Institutions).
Selected inputs, on the other hand, are subsidized through tax exemp-
tions of excise taxes (e.g. mineral oil).
30. In Table A5 the shares are listed to which the volume of subsidiza-
tion for each industry is made up by the five categories of points of
intervention described above. A widespread application of all of them
among nearly all branches is apparent. However, the percentage shares
which are sometimes high, should not obscure the fact that in most cases
rather small amounts of money are concerned. As was demonstrated be-
fore through the inter-industrial comparison of degrees of subsidization
(Table A3), the relative importance of total subsidization is of minor sig-
nificance for most branches; only a few industries are subsidized to a
great extent. This becomes obvious again when comparing subsidies in
relation to the aggregates subsidized (Table A6). Apart from the ratios
of investment promotion the inter-industrial pattern of subsidization of- 20 -
all other aggregates does not provide for most cases a range of values
which differs much from zero. Thus, rank correlations which were com-
puted could not indicate much evidence for any prevailing overall
strategy of channeling public assistance to branches by means of subsi-
dizing different aggregates. Rather, it seems that some highly subsidized
industries with a comparatively poor economic performance like, e.g.
agriculture, coal mining, railways, are assisted above average through
all channels.
Most important is the promotion of investment. This is especially true for
most manufacturing industries which together obtain 43 p.c. of their
subsidies for investment activities (Table A5). Roughly 10 p.c. of total
investments of the private economy are financed through assistance out
of public households (Table A6). Since the German tax system is often
said to be less attractive for capital formation than those of other coun-
tries [cf. e.g. King, Fullerton, 1980], the orientation of German sub-
sidization policy towards investment promotion might be regarded as a
correcting device. However, the inter-sectoral pattern of selective in-
vestment assistance does not give much evidence for subsidization policy
stepping in as a promising substitute for general tax measures: There is
a negative rank-order correlation to be observed between the ratios of
investment promotion of the different industries and their long-term eco-
nomic performance (growth-rates of real gross value added) which is
strongest for the subgroup of highly subsidized industries (R = -0,61).
Thus, investment promotion as well rather proves to be a device of
mainly maintaining less successful industries.
31. Which consequences on the structure of economic activities result
from subsidization as well as from other protection measures is not a
specific matter of this paper. In any event, the recipients of assistance
probably will consider public aids not only as a mean through which
their behaviour shall be influenced but as a source of rent, as well, i.e.
entrepreneurs look at them as an opportunity for windfall profits, and
workers as a source to cover higher wages. Thus, subsidization may well
prove to be an instrument to inflate costs (1). Since wage levels and
labour market as a whole show to be rather inflexible in the face of
changing economic circumstances, there is a strong a priori supposition
that subsidies establish an opportunity to appropriate them in the form
of higher wages. Indeed, cross-sector comparisons of the average level
of per hour-wages and degrees of subsidization substantiate such a view
(2).
(1) Normally such cost inflating effects are not recognized by the re-
cipients of subsidies. This once became obvious from a statement of
a lobbyist of the highly subsidized coal mining industry which he
made before the budget committee of the Federal Parliament during a
hearing about subsidization policy. "I am surprised to hear that the
price level of domestic coal should be artificially excessive. I don't
know from which reasons this assumption originates: We add our
costs and that's it!" [Deutscher Bundestag, b, 1982, p. 186; own
translation].
(2) Spearman rank-order correlation for the total economy: R = 0.40; for
manufacturing: R = 0.62.- 21 -
In how far public assistance may impair the cost-consciousness of enter-
prises becomes apparent from an individual example: Medium-scale ship-
yards which are privately owned and which are only slightly subsidized,
spend D-Mark 45-50 on direct labour cost per hour as measured at a
normal level of capacity utilization. Howaldtwerke-Deutsche Werft AG
(HDW), however, which is one of the biggest German shipyards, publicly
owned and highly subsidized, comes up to D-Mark 75-80 [ cf. Unabhan-
gige Sachverstandigenkommission, 1984, pp. 65]. And since HDW always
can rely on the liability of its public owners to settle deficits, the com-
pany is able to accept high wage levels and to attract qualified personnel
easier than its competitors. Furtheron, there is some evidence that the
permanent subsidization of some regionally concentrated industries (e.g.
coal mining, shipbuilding) resulted in high wage standards for whole
regions, thus impeding the regional restructuring process [Krieger,
Weskamp, Thoroe, 1985, pp. 109].
4. Concluding Remarks
32. The conclusions arrived at are somewhat simplified and cut across
the individual interests which governments and their agencies might have
in subsidizing the economy. A number of points can be made to charac-
terize German subsidization policy:
- The main institutional feature of the system is marked by its large
scattering and decentralization. Subsidies are distributed from roughly
10 000 different budgetary items in the federal and other budgets.
- The large number of programmes may give the impression that many
different objectives were pursued by the authorities. However, neither
the logic of economic goals and the ranking of their priorities is clear
at all, nor is there a co-ordination between the different suppliers of
subsidies. A coherent industrial policy being all of a piece does not
exist. At the level of political rhetoric a commitment to a growth-
oriented subsidization strategy is mostly claimed.
- The huge package of subsidy programmes has something in store for
everyone. Actually, each industry receives some kind of assistance at
least, but only very few branches remarkable amounts. Multiple sub-
sidization from different suppliers and programmes for the same pur-
pose and activity is quite often observed.
- From the inter-industrial pattern of the distribution of subsidies there
is little evidence for a subsidization strategy of picking the winners.
More indications point to an overall strategy of maintaining less suc-
cessful industries, especially, since the biggest part of all subsidies is
spent for some declining industries.
- Considering the structure of financing subsidies through taxes as well,
strengthens the impression that German subsidization policy mostly
redistributes money from structurally strong sectors to weak ones.
- There is some evidence that subsidization policy has inflated costs,
especially wages.- 22 -
33. The complex and confusing system favours tendencies to look at it
from a partial point of view, i.e. the promotion of one product, one
enterprise, one region, or one production-line, and since many pro-
grammes rather contain small sums of money the issue of financing sub-
sidies is mostly not taken into account or is played down as a negligible
fact at the margin. However, "many a little make a mickle" and, indeed,
the total volume of subsidization has reached a level which makes it like-
ly that huge allocational distortions and an excessive taxation have taken
place. Furtheron, the lack of a co-ordinated system favours attitudes as
well, always to add new programmes, but seldom to abolish or restruc-
ture old ones, thus constantly stimulating new demands for further sub-
sidies.
34. So far German subsidization policy was discussed in a national con-
text and was measured against the declared market-oriented pretensions
of the Federal Republic. Of course, there is an international dimension
as well. Thus, the final question remains at which rank the Federal Re-
public is placed in the international subsidy race.
A clear-cut answer based on definite numerical quantities is hardly to
achieve. At a first glance, Germany seems to be in the lower midfield.
However, in internationally comparable statistics under the heading "sub-
sidies" there are only reported current transfers to enterprises which do
not give an exhaustive description of the total spectrum of subsidization
policies. For instance, capital transfers like investment grants are not
included therein, assistance in the form of preferential loans is stated as
an increase in stocks in the capital accumulation account, and tax expen-
ditures are not incorporated in national accounts at all.
For some subsidization components more or less comparable figures can
be collected from international data sources. From OECD statistics (Table
A7) it becomes apparent that especially German subsidization policy is
relying very much on capital transfers (investment grants) while Sweden
on the other hand prefers wage subsidies which according to the system
of national accounts represent subsidies in a narrow sense. Thus, a
more comprehensive data compilation changes the rank order of national
degrees of subsidization significantly.
35. A more detailed basis of comparison is possible for EC-member coun-
tries through general government statistics of EUROSTAT. In the case of
the Federal Republic, figures computed from EC-statistic come very close
to the total amount of financial assistance which we have calculated on
our own (1). The cross-country comparison (Table A8) reveals that Ger-
man degrees of subsidization are lower than those of most other EC-mem-
bers, especially in contrast to those of the smaller countries. One should
keep in mind, however, that the figures of Table A8 only indicate one
(1) In 1981, for instance, subsidization categories from EC-statistics add
to a volume of D-Mark 63.9 bn (see footnotes in Table A8) against
D-Mark 69.4 bn in our own calculations. The difference is due to
our inclusion of preferential loans (D-Mark 2.7 bn) and the govern-
mental takeover of contributions to the agricultural social insurance
system (D-Mark 3.9 bn); the two items cannot be separated in EC-
statistics.- 23 -
part of all subsidizing measures. Excluded are preferential loans and tax
expenditures, which in some countries (e.g. France, Germany) are a
very important source of subsidization.
To get to know the exact quantities of the different degrees of national
subsidization is ultimately of secondary significance, because different
overall levels will be equalized by currency exchange rates. What is
really important to know is the inter-industrial structure of subsidiza-
tion. Just as differences in subsidies among industries and sectors are
important for the national allocation of resources, the same is true for
the international composition of the division of labour. But such figures
are not available for most countries. With regard to the Federal Republic
of Germany the Kiel Institute has closed this gap. The results show that
there is no reason for Germany to play the role of an injured innocent in
the international subsidy game.- 24 -
Table Al - Subsidies For 49 Branches, 1973-1984 (Million D-Mark)
Economic Sector/Industry
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries
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Source: Jiittemeier, 1987.- 25 -
T.iblo A? - Subsidies For 49 Branches Broken Down By Type of Subsidy And Subsidisation Policy, Average l'JRO-fil (Million n-M.uk)
Economic Sector/Industry
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries
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Source: Jiittemeier, 1987,- 26 -
Table A3 - Indicators Of The Intersectoral Pattern Of Subsidization
Economic Sector/Industry
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries
















Drawing Plants, Cold Rolling Mills,
Steel Shaping








Precision And Optical Goods, Clocks And
Watches
Iron, Steel, Sheet And Metal Goods




Pulp, Paper And Paperboard Production



















education, Science, Art, Publishing
Health And Veterinary Services
Other Private Services, n.e.s.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sourco: Jiittemeier, 1987.- 27 -
Table A4 - Intersectoral Pattern of Discrimination at the Government Level (Average 1980-81)
Economic Sector/Industry
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries
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Source: Juttemeier, 1987.- 28 -
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Source: JUttemeier, 1987.- 29 -
Table A6 - Intersectoral Pattern of Ratios of Subsidization, Average 1980-81 (p.c. of Aggregates Subsidized)
Economic Sector/Industry
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries
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Source: Jiittemeier, 1987.- 30 -


































































































































































































































































































































Source: OECD (b), 1985. - Own calculations and estimates.- 31 -
Table A8- Comparison of Subsidization Between EC-Member Countries, 1970-1982








































































































































































































































































(1) Included are the following items (cf. Eurostat (b)): Subsidies to other sectors, transfers to non-profit institu-
tions, miscellaneous current transfers to other residents sectors, investment grants to other resident sectors, other
capital transfers to other residents sectors. (2) Included are the items from (1) plus corresponding transfers
supplied by institutions of the European Communities.
Source: Eurostat (a), various issues. - Eurostat (b), various issues. - Own calculations.- 32 -
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